

# Data Anonymization and Quantifying Risk Competition

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# Issues in Anonymization

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- 1. No real **dataset**
  - Data owner won't publish confidential dataset. Inconsistent Quasi-identifiers
- 2. No standard **metrics** for quantifying risk
  - Complicated models. Risk depends on many factors, e.g. dataset, technical skill, availability of background data. Utility depends on use case (but which is unknown when collecting data)
- 3. No standard model of **adversary**
  - “mildly motivated adversary” vs. “highly motivated adversary”

# Competition PWSCUP 2015, 2016

- Privacy Workshop
- Organized by IPSJ, CSEC SIG

	2015	2016
Venue	Nagasaki (Brick Hall)	Akita (Castel Hotel)
When	Oct. 21, 22	Oct. 11, 12
Participants	13 Teams (20 in total)	15 Teams (42 in Total)
Dataset	NSTAC synthesized data	UCI Dataset, Online Retail




# Our Approach

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- 1. Common Dataset
  - We have used “pseudo microdata” synthesized by governmental agency, NSTAC, in 2015, and UCI Online Retail in 2016.
- 2. Quantifying risk
  - We focus on “records re-identification” risk and defines baseline **utility functions** and **some re-identification algorithms**. With arbitrary techniques, the best anonymization dataset is determined.
- 3. Adversary Model
  - We adopt Josef Domingo’s “*maximum-knowledge attacker*” model.

# Dataset 'Online Retail'

- Available from UCI Machine Learning Repository  
<https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Online+Retail>
- Real payment transaction of UK Online Shop
  - One year transactions from 2010 Dec.
  - Gift shop
  - 540,000 records



# Dataset 'Online Retail'

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## ■ Master $M$

- $n = 400$  customers
- From 36 countries


Customer ID	Sex	Birthday	Nationality
Online retail	synthesized		Online retail
12360	M	1876/2/24	Australia
12361	F	1954/2/14	Belgium
12362	F	1963/12/2	Belgium
12364	F	1960/9/16	Belgium

## ■ Transaction $T$


- $m = 38,087$  records
- 2,781 goods (stock code)

Customer ID	Invoice ID	Date	Time	Stock Code	Unit Price	Quantity
12362	544203	2011/2/17	10:30	21913	3.75	4
12362	544203	2011/2/17	10:30	22431	1.95	6
12361	545017	2011/2/25	13:51	22630	1.95	12
12361	545017	2011/2/25	13:51	22326	2.95	6

# Privacy Risks (in Japan)



# The Game




$$\text{Re-identification rate } \text{Re-ID}(P, Q) = \frac{\# \text{ Correct records}}{n'} = 2/3$$



# Adversary Model

## ■ Maximum Knowledge Adversary Model



# Use cases and Utility

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- 1. RFM Analysis

- Classification of customers based on **R**ecency (last purchase), **F**requency (of purchase), **M**onetary (Amount of payment)

U3: ut-rfm

- 2. Association Rule mining

- Association rule of stock code

U4: ut-top\_item

- 3. Cross tabulation

- Accumulation of payment for several categories, sex, age, countries.

U1: ut-cmae


U2: ut-cmae2

# Sample Re-identification

No	Algorithm	Description	M	T
E1	Re-birthday.py	Find the shortest birthday	✓	
E2	Re-eqi.rb	Find exact match	✓	✓
E3	Re-sort.rb	Sort and match	✓	
E4	Re-sort.rb	Sort by M and match	✓	
E5	Re-recnum.py	Find the shortest # recipients		✓
E6	Re-eqtr.rb	Find the same T		✓
E7	Re-tnum.rb	Sort by # records		✓
E8	Re-voting.py	Voting by birth, mean time, payment		✓
E9	Re-meantime.py	Find the shortest mean time		✓
E10	Re-ret.jar	Find similar set of goods		✓
E11	Re-sort2.tb	Sort by time and match		✓
E12	Re-search.rb	Find the shortest total payments		✓
E13	Re-totprice.py	Find the nearest set of goods		✓

# E7 re-tnum-bi (best re-id score)

- ❑ Step 1: count # records in T for each customer
- ❑ Step 2: sort C-ID and P-ID by # records and birthday
- ❑ Step 3: match two sorted sequence and output Q



# Competition rule


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## ■ Rule Ver. 1.3

- (1) Each team submits one anonymized data.
- (2) Reject **cheating** anonymization
- (3) Each team is allowed to re-identify the anonymized data submitted by others in hour.
- (4) Winner is determined by grade defined by  $U + E$ , the sum of minimum utilities and the minimum security (max re-identification rate).
- (5) Best Re-identification is award to team who succeeds to re-identetify the winner's data.

# The “Cheating”

## ■ Cheating anonymization



## ■ Cheating detection

□ Y1 (subset) > 50,000

□ Y2 (Jaccard) > 0.7

Y1:


$\mu_{P(X)}$  = Total monthly payment of  $P(X)$  = 305

$\mu_X$  = Total monthly payment of  $X$  = 405

Y2:

$S'_x$  = set of goods paid by  $X$

$S_{P(X)}$  = set of goods paid by  $P(X)$



Browser address bar: <https://pwscup.personal-data.biz/login/WorldCup/index>

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By NIFTY Powered. Test team Logout

**PWS CUP** 匿名加工・再識別コンテスト

Contest Rankings Ranking (2016) Configuration manual

0.006 sec

**Contest**  
**-> Anonymize**

An  
re-i

In the "anonymous and re-identification contest", to the anonymous data that participants submitted, other participants will attempt to re-identify. By re-identified by the researchers to each other, to verify the safety of anonymous data.




## Anonymization and re-identification contest

In the "anonymous and re-identification contest", to the anonymous data that participants submitted, other participants will attempt to re-identify. By re-identified by the researchers to each other, to verify the safety of anonymous data.

# Competition Result (Top 10 teams)


No	team
1	T-AND-N
2	Shirai 5000
3	Renkin
4	Justice
5	Bottchi
6	Ramen
7	Suteteko 2
8	nifigaki
9	MDLer
10	Anonymers





# Automated and Manual re-id.

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# Conclusions

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- Data anonymization competition 2016 with real online retail data was done successfully.
- Average re-identification is 188 (47%) out of 400 customers. The best (minimum) re-identification ratio is 22%.
- Mean Automated re-identification was 18%, manual re-identification was 47%.
  - Kikuchi, et.al, “A Study from the Data Anonymization Competition Pwscup 2015”, DPM 2016, LNCS 9963.
  - Kikuchi, et. Al, “Ice and Fire: Quantifying the Risk of Re-identification and Utility in Data Anonymization”, IEEE AINA 2016.