

# Research Activities in KDDI Research on Post-Quantum Cryptography

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29, November 2023

Topics:

1. Security Evaluation of **Code-based Cryptography** — Activities in DecodingChallenge — (15min)
2. Ultra High-Speed **Symmetric Cryptography**: Rocca-S (5min)






# Security Evaluation of Code-based Cryptography

## — Activities in DecodingChallenge —

- In 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched NIST-PQC project to select the U.S. standard for **post-quantum cryptography**.
  - They accepted 69 submissions.
- NIST evaluated algorithms across three categories: **public-key encryption** (merged with key-establishment in Round 2), **key-establishment** and **digital signature**.
- The objective is to finalize the selection of the U.S. standard by around 2024.
  - Digital signatures are important considering the requirement for long-term security preservation.





# Latest Trends in NIST-PQC

4/23

- On July 5, 2022, NIST-PQC announced that four schemes were selected as the candidates of the US standard.
- Additional four schemes are currently undergoing evaluation in Round 4.

 : Selected       : Round 4

Lattice-based		Code-based		Isogeny-based	Hash-based
CRYSTALS-KYBER (Key-Est)	CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM (Key-Est)	Classic McEliece (Key-Est)	BIKE (Key-Est)	SIKE (Key-Est)	SPHINCS+ (Sign)
FALCON (Sign)		HQC (Key-Est)		<b>Attacked</b>	

- The remaining code-based cryptographic schemes in Round 4 are attracting attention as candidates.

“Although Classic McEliece is widely regarded as secure, NIST does not anticipate it being widely used due to its large public key size. **NIST may choose to standardize Classic McEliece** at the end of the fourth round.” NIST PQC Forum July 6, 2022




# Cryptographic Competition

5/23

- We evaluate the practical security of PQC through cryptographic competitions.
- ➡ By solving higher-dimensional cryptography, we can design optimal parameters that offer both security and efficiency.

## SVP Challenge (Lattice-based Cryptography) 2013



**SVP CHALLENGE**

**HALL OF FAME**

Position	Dimension	Euclidean Norm	Seed	Contestant	Solution	Algorithm	Subm. Date	Approx. Factor
1	180	3509	0	L. Lucas, M. Stevens, W. van Woerden	vec	Sieving	2021-02-8	1.04002
2	178	3447	0	L. Lucas, M. Stevens, W. van Woerden	vec	Sieving	2021-02-8	1.02725
3	176	3487	0	L. Lucas, M. Stevens, W. van Woerden	vec	Sieving	2020-10-13	1.04411
4	170	3438	0	L. Lucas, M. Stevens, W. van Woerden	vec	Sieving	2020-05-12	1.04690
5	158	3240	0	Sho Hasegawa, Yuntao Wang, Eiichiro Fujisaki	vec	Sieving	2021-01-22	1.02311
6	157	3320	0	L. Lucas, M. Stevens, W. van Woerden	vec	Sieving	2019-05-20	1.04906
7	156	3219	0	Sho Hasegawa, Yuntao Wang, Eiichiro Fujisaki	vec	Sieving	2021-01-22	1.01986
8	155	3165	0	M. Albrecht, L. Lucas, G. Herold, E. Kirshanova, E. Postlethwaite, M.	vec	Sieving	2018-09-18	1.00803

## Decoding Challenge (Code-based Cryptography) 2019

**Syndrome Decoding Problem**

ndrome Decoding problem for random binary linear codes.

Given integers  $n, k, w$  such that  $k \leq n$  and  $w \leq n$ , an instance of the problem is a parity-check matrix  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$  and a vector  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n-k}$  (called the *syndrome*). A vector  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$  of Hamming weight  $\leq w$  such that  $\mathbf{H}\mathbf{e}^T = \mathbf{s}^T$ .

on instances with code rate  $R = 0.5$ , that is  $n = 2k$ . We will choose a weight  $w$  close to the **Varshamov bound**:  $w = \lceil 1.05 d_{GV} \rceil$ . The matrix  $\mathbf{H}$  and the syndrome  $\mathbf{s}$  are generated in this context, **with very high probability** there exists a vector  $\mathbf{e}$  of weight  $\leq w$ .

ces with cryptographic size are assumed to be out of reach, so we propose a challenge to see how hard this problem is in practice. The **Low-weight Codeword** challenge is a special case: instances of fixed cryptographic size but where the goal is to make  $w$  as small as possible.

nces are generated using a **Python script**. This script takes as input the length of the code  $n$  and the weight  $w$ .

**Submit your solution**

**Hall of fame**

**Download instances**

Instance generator


Format of instances

**A list of instances** with seed 0 (indexed by length)

Tooltips give an indication of complexity.

10	20	30	40
50	60	70	80

## SIKE Cryptographic Challenge (Isogeny-Based Cryptography) 2021



**SIKE Cryptographic Challenge**

**CHALLENGE DESCRIPTION**

**Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE)** is a candidate algorithm for the upcoming post-quantum cryptography standard. It was proposed by a collaboration of researchers and engineers from across the globe.

The SIKE Cryptographic Challenge invites researchers from across the globe to attempt to break the SIKE algorithm for two sets of toy parameters, and to share their findings with Microsoft. Qualified submissions are eligible for an award of **\$5,000 USD** for the solution of the smaller instance and an award of **\$50,000 USD** for the solution of the larger instance.

This challenge is subject to these terms and those outlined in the [Microsoft Bounty Terms and Conditions](#).

It is hosted by *Inria*



# Syndrome Decoding Problem (SDP)

6/23

Input: Positive integer  $n, k, w$ , matrix  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$  and  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n-k}$

Output: A vector  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$  that satisfies  $\mathbf{H}\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{s}$  where  $\text{wt}(\mathbf{e}) = w$

$n = 8$   
 $k = 4$   
 $w = 3$

$\mathbf{H}$  : Given


$\mathbf{s}$ : Given

	$h_1$	$h_2$	$h_3$	$h_4$	$h_5$	$h_6$	$h_7$	$h_8$
	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

$\mathbf{s}$

1  
1  
1  
1

$\mathbf{e} = 01110000$   
(Solution)



Difficult to  
solve !  
(If appropriate  
parameters are  
used)

- Information Set Decoding (ISD) is used to solve SDP efficiently

Algorithm	Year	Asymptotic Time Complexity
Prange [1]	1962	$2^{0.121n}$
Dumer [2]	1991	$2^{0.117n}$
May-Meurer-Thomae (MMT)[3]	2011	$2^{0.112n}$
Becker-Joux-May-Meurer (BJMM)[4]	2012	$2^{0.102n}$
May-Ozerov (MO)[5]	2015	$2^{0.0953n}$
Both-May (BM) [6,7]	2018	$2^{0.0951n}$

[1] E. Prange, "The use of information sets in decoding cyclic codes," 1962.

[2] I. Dumer, "On minimum distance decoding of linear codes," 1991.

[3] A. May, et al., "Decoding random linear codes in  $\sim O(20.054n)$ ," 2011.

[4] A. Becker, et al., "Decoding random binary linear codes in  $2n/20$ : How  $1 + 1 = 0$  improves information set decoding," 2012



[5] A. May and I. Ozerov, "On computing nearest neighbors with applications to decoding of binary linear codes," 2015

[6] L. Both and A. May, "Decoding linear codes with high error rate and its impact for LPN security," 2018

[7] A. Esser, "Revisiting Nearest-Neighbor-Based Information Set Decoding", 2023



- ISD repeatedly executes permutation, Gaussian elimination, and solution search for an input matrix  $\mathbf{H}$  and syndrome  $\mathbf{s}$ .









# Prange's Algorithm

9/23

- Prange's algorithm is the world's first ISD algorithm.
  - It just checks the weight of  $\hat{s}$  in Search, if  $\text{wt}(\hat{s}) = w$ , the solution is  $e \leftarrow R^{-1}(0, \hat{s})$ .
  - It has a drastically smaller WF compared to naive search.





$$WF = n(n-k)^2 \frac{\binom{n}{w}}{\binom{n-k}{w}}$$



# Dumer's Algorithm

10/23

- Dumer's algorithm utilizes **2-lists merging** (birthday decode) to reduce the WF
- Success probability  $P$  significantly increases compared to Prange's ISD



- $P = \frac{\binom{(k+\ell)/2}{p}^2 \binom{n-k-\ell}{w-2p}}{\binom{n}{w}}$
- $T = n(n-k)^2 + |L_1| + \max\left(|L_1|, \frac{|L_1|^2}{2^\ell}\right)$
- $WF = T/P$

Prange's:

$$P = \frac{\binom{n-k}{w}}{\binom{n}{w}}$$

Prange's:

$$T = n(n-k)^2$$


➔ For more details, Let's check web contents about ISD in **Canal-U TV** provided by *Inria*



# May-Meurer-Thomae (MMT) Algorithm

11/23

- The MMT algorithm utilizes **4-lists merging** for a more efficient search
- A smaller  $T$  can be obtained for the same  $P$  as the Dumer's algorithm



$k + \ell$		$n - k - \ell$		
$Q_1$		$\theta$		$\ell_1$
$Q_2$				$\ell_2$
$Q_3$		$I$		$n - k - \ell$

$\leftarrow G(HR)$

- $P = \frac{\binom{(k+\ell)/2}{p}^2 \binom{n-k-\ell}{w-2p}}{\binom{n}{w}}$
- $T = n(n-k)^2 + |L_{11}| + \max\left(|L_{11}|, \frac{|L_{11}|^2}{2^{\ell_1}}\right) + \max\left(|L_1|, \frac{|L_1|^2}{2^{\ell_2}}\right)$
- $WF = T/P$

Dumer's:

$$T = n(n-k)^2 + |L_1| + \max\left(|L_1|, \frac{|L_1|^2}{2^\ell}\right)$$






# Parallelized ISD Algorithms

12/23

- Significant acceleration through parallelization is indispensable for solving large-scale SDPs.
- We employ parallelization for the **entire** processes and for **internal** search.



Paper	HW	Parallelization	ISD Algorithm
FPGA Stern Attack [1]	FPGA	Entire	Stern
Parallel MMT/BJMM [2]	CPU	Entire	MMT/BJMM
cuDumer [3]	GPU	Internal	Dumer
cuMMT [4]	GPU	Internal	MMT

- [1] S. Heyse, et al. "Attacking code-based cryptosystems with information set decoding using special-purpose hardware," 2014
- [2] A. Esser, et al. "McEliece needs a break – solving McEliece-1284 and Quasi-Cyclic-2918 with modern ISD," 2022
- [3] S. Narisada, et al. "Fast GPU implementation of dumer's algorithm solving the syndrome decoding problem," 2021.
- [4] S. Narisada, et al. "Multiparallel MMT : Faster ISD Algorithm Solving High-Dimensional Syndrome Decoding Problem," 2022.




# Hardware Configuration

13/23

- We use several PC/Servers to solve large-scale SDP
- Local PC i) :Desktop PC equipped with a dedicated GPGPU board: **NVIDIA Tesla V100S**.
- Local PC ii): Desktop PC equipped with a general-purpose GPU board: **GeForce RTX 4080**.
- Cloud Server: AWS P3 instance (p3.2xlarge, with a **NVIDIA Tesla V100**)



Local PC i) in our lab  
(with a circulator fan for cooling)



## ■ Decryption results in the Decoding Challenge:

SDP instance ( $n, k, \omega$ )	Difficulty to solve	HW Configuration	# of PC/Servers	Actual decryption time
SDP(510,255,62)	$2^{54}$	Local PC (i)	4	24.7 days
SDP(530,260,65)	$2^{56}$	Local PC (i)	4	12.5 days
SDP(540,270,66)	$2^{57}$	Cloud Server	22	79.4 days
SDP(550,275,67)	$2^{58}$	Local PC (i)	4	13.0 days
SDP(570,285,70)	$2^{60}$	Local PC (ii)	10	45.3 days
SDP(1409,1127,26)	$2^{63}$	Local PC (ii)	10	30 hours (70 days expected)

Memory usage of cuMMT per one Local PC (ii) : **800 [MB]**



## SDP Challenge

Home Generic problems ▾ NIST-like problems ▾ Documentation Contact

### Syndrome Decoding Problem Hall of Fame

WF:  $2^{60}$

Length	Weight	Authors	Algorithm	Date	Details
570	70	Shintaro Narisada, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	MMT variant	2023-04-17	<a href="#">See details</a>
550	67	Shintaro Narisada, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	MMT	2022-02-23	<a href="#">See details</a>
540	66	Shintaro Narisada, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	MMT	2022-02-01	<a href="#">See details</a>
530	65	Shintaro Narisada, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	MMT	2021-10-27	<a href="#">See details</a>
510	61	Shintaro Narisada, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	MMT	2021-09-19	<a href="#">See details</a>
500	59	Greg Meyer	Dumer	2020-07-27	<a href="#">See details</a>
490	59	Greg Meyer	Dumer	2020-08-	<a href="#">See</a>



# Results of Decoding Challenge (as of Dec. 29, 2023)

16/23

## Goppa McEliece Challenge

[Home](#) [Generic problems](#) [NIST-like problems](#) [Documentation](#) [Contact](#)

### Syndrome Decoding in the Goppa-McEliece Setting Hall of Fame

WF :  $2^{63}$

Length	Weight	Authors	Algorithm	Date	Details
1409	26	Shintaro Narisada, Hiroki Furue, Yusuke Aikawa, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	MMT variant	2023-11-13	<a href="#">See details</a>
1347	25	Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, Christiane Peters	See <a href="https://isd.mceliece.org/1347.html">https://isd.mceliece.org/1347.html</a> for more information.	2023-02-24	<a href="#">See details</a>
1284	24	Andre Esser, Alex May and Floyd Zweyding	MMT variant	2021-08-16	<a href="#">See details</a>
1223	23	Andre Esser, Alex May and Floyd Zweyding	BJMM/MMT variant	2021-05-10	<a href="#">See details</a>
1161	22	Shintaro Narisada, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto	Dumer	2021-01-10	<a href="#">See details</a>
1101	21	Anders Nilson	Multi threads Dumer4, Gregory Landais impl.	2020-08-14	<a href="#">See details</a>





# Ultra High-Speed Symmetric Cryptography: Rocca-S



# Use Cases for 6G: Need for Ultra High-Speed Encryption

18/23

Communication exceeding 100Gbps is expected in various use cases.\*



**Immersive Experiences**  
Enabled by Advanced XR  
Technologies



**XR (Extended Reality)**  
with Multiple Sensors

**Data Collection**  
from Massive  
Sensors



**High-Definition Holograms**

(\*) KEY DRIVERS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES FOR 6G UBIQUITOUS WIRELESS INTELLIGENCE <http://jultika.oulu.fi/files/isbn9789526223544.pdf>



## The world's first symmetric cryptography that meets all the requirements of 6G.

- Rocca-S achieves speeds exceeding **200Gbps** (SW) and **2Tbps** (HW), establishing itself as the world's fastest stream cipher for the 6G era.
- It supports **256-bit keys** and incorporates both data encryption and **data authentication** features.

### Origin of the name Rocca-S

- We have selected the term "**Rocca**" as a uniquely Japanese word from among the candidates with a sound similar to "**Roku**" (six in Japanese) in the context of 6G.
- "**Rocca**" means **fortress** in Italian and reflects our intention to design robust cryptography.




## Rocca-S achieves performance exceeding 200Gbps on PCs and over 90Gbps on smartphones.

Devices	Model name/ CPU	Performance [Gbps]
PC	Intel® Core i7™ (13 <sup>th</sup> Generation)	234 Gbps (Encryption only)
		207 Gbps (Authenticated encryption)
	Intel® Core i9™(13 <sup>th</sup> Generation)	254 Gbps (Encryption only)
		227 Gbps (Authenticated encryption)
Smartphone	iPhone 14 Pro Max / Apple A16 Bionic	93.0 Gbps (Encryption only)
		87.4 Gbps (Authenticated encryption)
	Galaxy Z Flip4 / Snapdragon 8+ Gen 1	71.5 Gbps (Encryption only)
		66.2 Gbps (Authenticated encryption)
	iPhone 13 / Apple A15 Bionic	86.2 Gbps (Encryption only)
		76.4 Gbps (Authenticated encryption)
	Google Pixel 3 / Snapdragon 845	33.9 Gbps (Encryption only)
		31.1 Gbps (Authenticated encryption)




Rocca-S incorporates both data encryption and **data authentication** features.





Rocca-S **maximizes** encryption processing speed to the utmost limits.



## Optimal parallelization

Rocca-S processes **multiple blocks in parallel** and make the amount of arithmetic processing for each block uniform to achieve better performance.

## Optimal block-to-block connection structure

Rocca-S selects the connection structure that achieve the **best balance of security and performance** from 13 million candidates.


## Utilization of hardware instructions

Rocca-S achieves acceleration by employing the AES round function and utilizing CPU hardware instructions (such as **AES-NI**).



# Comparison with Symmetric Cryptography in 5G (on Intel Core i7)

23/23









# McEliece Cryptosystem

25/23

■ Encryption:  $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{m}\hat{\mathbf{G}} + \mathbf{e}$  ( $\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_2^k, \hat{\mathbf{G}} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{k \times n}$  where  $\text{wt}(\mathbf{e}) = w, \hat{\mathbf{G}} = \mathbf{SGP}$ )

Ciphertext
Plaintext
Public key
Noise
Secret key

■ Decryption:  $\mathbf{cP}^{-1} = \mathbf{mSG} + \mathbf{eP}^{-1} \rightarrow \text{decode}(\mathbf{mSG} + \mathbf{eP}^{-1}) = \mathbf{mS} \rightarrow (\mathbf{mS})\mathbf{S}^{-1} = \mathbf{m}$

Ciphertext
Secret key
Secret key

■ Example:

● Encryption :

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \left[ \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{array} \right] \\
 \text{Ciphertext}
 \end{array}
 =
 \begin{array}{c}
 \left[ \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \right] \\
 \text{Plaintext}
 \end{array}
 \begin{array}{c}
 \left[ \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \right] \\
 \text{Public key}
 \end{array}
 +
 \begin{array}{c}
 \left[ \begin{array}{cccc} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{array} \right] \\
 \text{Noise}
 \end{array}$$

**Message Attack** : An attacker try to restore secret information ( $\mathbf{m}$  or  $\mathbf{e}$ ) from public information ( $\mathbf{c}$  and  $\hat{\mathbf{G}}$ ).



**New symmetric cryptography is expected to meet the anticipated requirements for 2030 and beyond.**

## ■ Support for High-Speed and High-Capacity Communication

- Symmetric cryptography shall achieve **processing speeds of 100Gbps or higher** without causing any bottlenecks to ensure compatibility with the fast and high-capacity utilization in 6G.

## ■ Resistance to Quantum Computers

- Symmetric cryptography shall support a **key length of 256 bits**, which is twice as the current requirement for (4G/5G) to protect against large-scale quantum computers.

## ■ Compliance with Security Requirements Adopted in IETF

- Multiple vulnerabilities have occurred in the past due to improper use of encryption, such as OpenSSL. Symmetric cryptography shall **have data authentication feature (authentication encryption)** to address this issue at its core.