

LockOS : Embedded Operating System for Hardware Cache Locking support

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
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


Context

Timing vulnerabilities caused by behavior depending on a secret



SCRATCHS



SCRATCHS's goal is to **co-design** a **RISC-V processor** and a **com**piler toolchain:

- Immune sensitive code to timing side-channel attacks.
- ► Minimal overhead on the

Attacker: observes time \Rightarrow deduces secret

- Behavior duration depends on resource usage (like memory access).
- ► Timing is observable when resource usage is shared between the victim and the attacker.
- Countermeasures already exist (resources partitioning, Constant-Time programming), but are often costly.



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micro-architecture.


Considering a small-scale embedded system.

- **Hardware** implements **security mechanisms**.
- **Compiler** produces binaries able to use these mechanisms to be side-channel resistant.

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Cache lines locking mechanism

Memory hierarchy and some functional units temporal behaviors (e.g. ALU, LSU, division or branching) can leak information **(3)**.



We identify three sources of leakage on the CV32E40P RISC-V processor:

LockOS main Objectives


- Consider a more complex RISC-V processor.
 - ► additional features to fully support an operating system
- ► CVA6 core : This core implements RV32GC or RV64GC extensions with three privilege levels M, S, U. It includes branch prediction, a memory protection unit (MPU) and, optionally, an MMU
- Introduce a small operating system on the platform to
 - ► configure the MPU
 - manage SCRATCHS Locking mechanism. This includes
 - 1. handling unsuccessful memory locks
 - 2. identify processes that requires the use the proposed lock mechanism and grant them permissions to do it
 - 3. handling killed processes that have locked data in the cache memory

Leak		Solutions
Division and modulo op.	\rightarrow	Constant-time mode through a CSR
Non-aligned data requests	\rightarrow	Solved by compiler toolchain
Cache accesses (L1, L2, TLB)	\rightarrow	New lock and unlock instructions

lock/unlock mechanism:

- ► The cache line is locked in cache until the locking process issues an unlock operation
- ► At least one way of the cache is kept available to other processes' data
- Implement lock on skewed randomized cache to augment security level
- ► Low overhead targeting FPGA (<3% on registers and LUTs)

Project platform overview



- ▶ Implement a demonstrator on that new platform, with a realistic attack scenario, drawing inspiration from the automotive or medical domains.
- provide more compiler support (e.g. automatic insertion of lock instructions based on public/private annotations in the source program) or consider multi-level caches combined with our lock mechanism. (optional)

[1] N. Gaudin et al., "Work in Progress: Thwarting Timing Attacks in Microcontrollers using Fine-grained Hardware Protections", 2023 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), Delft, Netherlands, 2023, pp. 304-310, doi: 10.1109/EuroSPW59978.2023.00038.

[2] J-L. Hatchikian-Houdot et al., "Formal Hardware/Software Models for Cache Locking Enabling Fast and Secure Code", European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), 2024, doi: $10.1007/978-3-031-70896-1_8$.

[3] N. Gaudin et al., "A Fine-Grained Dynamic Partitioning Against Cache-Based Timing Attacks via Cache Locking", IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI), 2024, doi: 10.1109/ISVLSI61997.2024.00041.

