Stackelberg Games of Water Extraction

Alain Jean-Marie Université Côte d'Azur, Inria LIRMM, University of Montpellier/CNRS, France

> Mabel Tidball INRA, Lameta, Montpellier, France

Fernando Ordóñez, Victor Bucarey López Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile

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Non-cooperative setting Supervised setting with myopic followers Supervised setting with non-myopic followers Conclusions

The model Analysis

Ideas of the paper

We analyze a simple problem of water extraction.

- Myopic agents harvesting a common water resource
- A regulator has some control on the cost function
- The regulator takes into account rainfall and strategic interaction between agents

The model Analysis

Ideas of the paper (ctd.)

- Groundwater extraction: marginal cost depends on the level of the aquifer
- In general, resources with accessibility problems: cost depends on scarcity
- The main ingredient: make the cost depend on the projected evolution of the resource: before or after the extraction or rainfall
- The goal: deduce its economical and environmental consequences
- The method: a Stackelberg Game linear-quadratic static game between agents, different kinds of optimization for the regulator.

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The model Analysis

The model of Provencher and Burt

We consider the extraction of groundwater by K players. Dynamics of groundwater:

$$G_{t+1} = G_t + R - \sum_{k=1}^{K} u_t^k, \quad G_0, \quad \text{given}.$$

We suppose R is a constant.

Instantaneous profit:

$$\pi^i(u_t^i, G_t) = F_i(u_t^i) - C_i(G_t) \times u_t^i.$$

Marginal extraction cost $(C_i(.))$: depends on the current level of the groundwater.

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The model Analysis

The extended model

Introduce the more general instantaneous profit function:

$$\pi^{i}(u_{t}) = F_{i}(u_{t}^{i}) - C_{i}(G_{t} + mR - n\sum_{j}u_{t}^{j})u_{t}^{i}$$

where $n, m \in [0, 1]$. The extreme cases:

- n = 0, m = 0 (the standard case): cost based on current resource
- n = 1, m = 1: cost based on the state of the resource in the following period.

When $n \neq 0$ the profit function of player *i* depends on the action of the other player: strategic interaction not just through the dynamics.

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The mode Analysis

Angles of analysis

In a previous work, we developped the non-cooperative, Nash-feedback solution for agents.

Here, we develop the supervised setting

- myopic followers, static Stackelberg leader
- myopic followers, dynamic Stackelberg leader

 \rightarrow an exercise in sensitivity analysis of LQ dynamic games, and non-LQ, non-concave optimal control problems. Mostly work in progress...

- Non-cooperative setting
 The myopic case
- Supervised setting with myopic followers
- Output Supervised setting with non-myopic followers

The myopic case

The case of myopic agents

Assume agents play Nash with their instantaneous profit:

$$\max_{u^i}\left\{F_i(u^i_t)-C_i(G_t+mR-n\sum_{k=1}^{K}u^k_t)\ u^i_t\right\}.$$

For convenience, we continue with the particular linear-quadratic functional form:

$$F_i(u) = a_i u - \frac{b_i}{2}u^2, \quad C_i(x) = z_i - c_i x > 0.$$

The myopic case

Myopic agent reaction

In the symmetric case we find:

$$u(G) = \underbrace{\frac{c}{b + (K+1)cn}}_{\alpha} G + \underbrace{\frac{a - z + cmR}{b + (K+1)cn}}_{\gamma}$$

The value function of each player is:

$$\pi(G_0) = \frac{(cG_0 + a - z + cmR)^2}{(b + (K+1)cn)^2} \frac{b + 2cn}{2}$$

.

The myopic case

Myopic stock dynamics

The stock dynamics is:

$$G_{t+1} = G_t + R - K(\alpha G_t + \gamma)$$

= $(1 - K\alpha)^t G_0 + (R - K\gamma) \frac{1 - (1 - K\alpha)^t}{K\alpha}$

The asymptotic stock is:

$$G_{\infty} = \frac{R - K\gamma}{K\alpha} = \frac{Rb}{Kc} + \frac{K+1}{K}Rn - Rm - \frac{a-z}{c}$$

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- The model
- Analysis
- Non-cooperative setting
 The myopic case
 Myopic Reaction
 Stock Dynamics
- Supervised setting with myopic followers
 Static optimization
 Stackelberg game

Output Supervised setting with non-myopic followers

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Supervised setting

A regulator is in charge of selecting the cost model, by choosing the cost parameters *n* and *m*. The choice is announced to players, who play Nash. Followers are myopic:

$$u_t^i = \frac{c}{b + (K+1)cn}G_t + \frac{a - z + cmR}{b + (K+1)cn}$$

The supervisor optimizes her own criterion, taking this reaction into account.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Optimal static choice

The supervisor gets to choose n and m once and for all.

Optimal pricing problem

The supervisor's problem is:

$$\max_{(n,m)\in[0,1]^2}\left\{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta_L^t\sum_i\pi^i(u_t,G_t)\right\}$$

with the myopic agent reactions and stock dynamics

$$G_{t+1} = G_t + R - \sum_i u_t^i .$$

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Optimal static choice (ctd.)

Thanks to the explicit solution for the dynamics:

$$V_{nm}(G_0) = \frac{b + 2cn}{2} \left[\frac{\alpha^2 (G_0 - G_\infty)^2}{1 - \beta (1 - K\alpha)^2} + \frac{2R}{K} \frac{\alpha (G_0 - G_\infty)}{1 - \beta (1 - K\alpha)} + \frac{R^2}{K^2 (1 - \beta)} \right]$$

with

$$G_{\infty} = \frac{R - K\gamma}{K\alpha} .$$

$$\alpha = \frac{c}{(K+1)cn + b} \qquad \gamma = \frac{mRc + a - z}{(K+1)cn + b}$$

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Optimal static choice (ctd.)

 \rightarrow optimization wrt (n, m) for each G_0 . Results:

- $m^* = 1$ is always optimal if $K\alpha < 1$ (monotonous traj.)
- the optimal *n* is:


$$n^* = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } eta_L \leq \underline{eta}(\mathbf{G}_0) \\ 1 & \text{if } eta_L \geq \overline{eta}(\mathbf{G}_0) \\ n^*(eta_L) & \text{otw.} \end{cases}$$

but $n^*(\beta_L)$ is the root of a 4th degree polynomial.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Optimal static choice (ctd.)

A situation where $n^*(\beta_L) \notin \{0, 1\}$:



Static optimization Stackelberg game

Stackelberg with myopic followers

Followers being myopic, they apply the Nash controls. If symmetric:

$$u^{i}(G) = rac{c}{b+(K+1)cn} G + rac{a-z+cmR}{b+(K+1)cn}$$

The benevolent regulator maximizes the total discounted profit on their behalf:

 $\max_{\{n_t,m_t\}}\left\{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta_L^t\sum_iF(u^i(G_t))-C(G_t+m_tR-n_tU(G_t))u^i(G_t)\right\}$

with the dynamics:

$$G_{t+1} = G_t + R - Ku^i(G_t).$$

⇒ an optimal control problem.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

First-order conditions

From the maximum principle:

$$0 = \beta_L^t cU(G_t, n_t, m_t)(b + 2cn_t) + (b + (K+1)cn)(q_t - q_{t-1}) - Kcq_t$$

$$0 = \beta_L^t c U(G_t, n_t, m_t)^2 (b - (K + 1)(b + cn_t)) + (b + (K + 1)cn_t)(\lambda_t^{(n)} - \mu_t^{(n)}) + Kcq_t (K + 1)U(G_t, n_t, m_t)$$

$$0 = \beta_L^t cRU(G_t, n_t, m_t)(b + 2cn_t) + (b + (K + 1)cn_t)(\lambda_t^{(m)} - \mu_t^{(m)}) - KcRq_t.$$

where:

- $\lambda_t^{(n)}$, $\mu_t^{(n)}$ multipliers for $n_t \ge 0$ and $n_t \le 1$, *id* for $\lambda_t^{(m)}$, $\mu_t^{(m)}$.
- $U(\ldots)$ is the feedback function of followers.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Stationary situations

If a stationary state and control exists, then:

- optimal m: $m^* = 1$,
- optimal *n*:

$$n^* = \left\{ egin{array}{ll} 0 & ext{if } eta_L \leq rac{b}{b+c} \ 1 & ext{if } eta_L \geq rac{K(b+c)+c}{K(b+2c)+c} \ rac{K}{K+1} & rac{eta(b+c)-b}{(1-eta)c} & ext{otw.} \end{array}
ight.$$

But we don't know if a stationary state exists.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Stationary situations (ctd.)

Example with corner solution:

$$a = 1$$
, $b = 1$, $c = \frac{6}{10}$, $z = \frac{9}{10}$, $R = 1$, $\beta_L = \frac{95}{100}$

gives a candidate optimal strationary solution:

$$G^{\infty}=\frac{9}{2}, \qquad n^*=1.$$

Satisfies all first-order conditions.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Stationary situations (ctd.)

Example with interior solution:

$$a = 1, \quad b = 1, \quad c = \frac{1}{10}, \quad z = \frac{9}{10}, \quad R = 1, \quad \beta_L = 0.919$$

gives a candidate optimal strationary solution:


$$G^{\infty} \simeq 4.35, \qquad n^* = \frac{218}{243}.$$

Satisfies all first-order conditions.

Static optimization Stackelberg game

Stationary situations (ctd.)

The constant-policy value (starting from the expected steady state) is maximum at n^* :



Static optimization Stackelberg game

Non-stationary situations

However, convexity plays us tricks. Example:

$$a = 1$$
, $b = 1$, $c = \frac{6}{10}$, $z = \frac{9}{10}$, $R = 1$, $\beta_L = \frac{68}{100}$

gives a candidate optimal strationary solution:


$$G^{\infty} = \frac{1}{8}, \qquad n^* = \frac{11}{36}.$$

But...

the optimal constant policy is not there! And the Hamiltonian has actually a *local minimum* there wrt n.

Static optimization Stackelberg game


Non-stationary situations (ctd.)



Hamiltonian is for constant trajectory from the expected steady state.

Static optimization Stackelberg game


Non-stationary situations (ctd.)



Static optimization Stackelberg game

Non-stationary situations (ctd.)

Same values except R = 50, $\beta = 7/10$:



Static optimization Stackelberg game

A heuristic policy

These periodic policies were identified by using the following heuristic:

$$egin{array}{rcl} m(G) &=& 1 \ n(G) &=& rgmax\{V_{n1}(G) \mid 0 \leq n \leq 1\}. \end{array}$$

i.e. use the best static policy... but as state feedback.

Stackelberg with non-myopic followers

Followers being non-myopic, at time t they react to the sequence of "announced" regulations:

$$\{(n_t, m_t), (n_{t+1}, m_{t+1}), \ldots\}$$

while playing Nash!

- \implies very complicated control law...
- → not time-consistent?

Stackelberg with non-myopic followers (ctd)

A reasonable formulation: the supervisor announces feedback laws

$$G \mapsto n(G), \qquad G \mapsto m(G).$$

Followers play Nash Feedback with criterion:

$$\max_{\{u_t^i\}} \sum_{0}^{\infty} \beta_F^t [F_i(u_t^i) - C_i(G_t + m(G_t)R - n(G_t)\sum_k u_t^k) u_t^i],$$

and dynamics

$$G_{t+1} = G_t + R - \sum_k u_t^k, \quad G_0, \quad \text{given}.$$

Again an optimal control problem... to be studied.

Conclusions and extensions

Conclusions:

- regulator charges users in function of their behavior, not just in function of the level of resource
- introduce strategic interaction where there was none, in case of myopic agents $(n \neq 0)$
- difficult optimal control problem

Extensions under investigation

- simulations for the optimal control problem of the regulator
 - \rightarrow numerical methods, value iteration, policy iteration...
- non-myopic followers in the case of constant regulator policies
- stochastic case
 - \rightarrow learning algorithms under test
 - \rightarrow importance of m