Logical Foundations for Actual Causality Shonan Seminar No.139

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Overview

Motivation

Problems with HP

2 Proposal

- Situation Calculus
- Achievement Causes
- Achievement Causal Chain
- Maintenance Causes
- Actual Cause

3 Relationship with Halpern-Pearl

Conclusions

We envision that the following research questions will be addressed in the course of the seminar:

- What are current research activities in the area of causal reasoning, and what application scenarios are considered? What new and promising application areas of causal reasoning can be identified? In the light of changing paradigms of computing, how will causal reasoning have to change? For instance, what is the impact of the autonomy of cyber-physical systems on the notion of causality? What impact does emergent behavior of large collections of computing devices have on causality? Can causality analysis help in explaining the result of a program, for instance, the decisions of deep neural networks? How to generate useful explanations?
- How to characterize causality? Is there a better way to design "good" definitions of causality than relying on the trial-and-error scheme assessing candidate definitions on a host of textbook examples?
- What can causal reasoning on computing systems, and in social context for instance in litigation, tort law, or economy learn from each other?
- How can causal reasoning be applied to security and privacy properties, e.g., to determine the actors responsible for information leakage?
- What calculi and tools are available to support causal reasoning? For which type of tools is there a demand, and what are the desiderata for such tools?
- How to scale causal analysis, other than statistical approaches, to real-world applications? How do causal analysis and abstraction compose? How to design systems for accountability, in the sense that in the case of a system failure, the causes can be determined automatically?
- Is there a compendium of open or unsatisfactorily solved problems?

- Long-standing philosophical problem
- Token-level (actual) vs type-level (general) causality
- Actual cause: A thing which has caused another thing.
- Given a narrative and a statement ϕ that holds true at the end, how do we separate actual causes of ϕ from irrelevant events?
- Converting intuition into a formal definiton is not trivial
- Dominant approach in AI: *counterfactul analysis* in *systems of structural equations* (Pearl, Halpern, others)

- HP seems to work well within its ontological limits
- Or maybe not. See: "A quest for formal tools for reasoning about counterfactual causation" by Gössler, Stefani, Sokolsky

Problems of HP approach that we address

- Enduring conditions ("man is dead") vs. transitions ("man dies")
- Absence of event \equiv presence of it opposite
- No objects, relationships, time, quantifiers in queries
- Distinct domains appear isomorphic; contradictory intuitions [Hopkins and Pearl, 2007, Glymour et al., 2010, Beckers and Vennekens, 2012]
- [Hopkins and Pearl, 2007]: Situation Calculus Causal Models
- Kept PWS and all issues related to counterfactuals
- Interventions realized via ignoring precondition axioms (!)
- Did not define actual cause
- Example-driven

Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy's rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Because both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy's would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy's throw.

- We want to search for causes in dynamical systems
- Dynamical system: a system that undergoes change of some kind
- Dynamic systems have states and transitions between them
- Examples: pendulum, animal populations, digital circuits
- Kinds of change: discrete, continuous, hybrid

- Need a suitable language to describe and analyse dynamical systems
- Various formalisms for different applications are available
- Situation Calculus: "system as a logical theory"

Designed specifically to *formally* capture the phenomena of action, situation, and change

- Regression: an extremely useful deductive tool
- Key idea: reduce a query about some state to a logically equivalent query about a previous state
- Proposition: a formalism for causality must allow for regression
- First proposed in 1960's as *retrosynthetic analysis* for organic chemistry by Elias James Corey (NP 1990 in chemistry)
- Introduced as goal regression in AI by Richard Waldinger (1975)
- Adapted into situation calculus by Raymond Reiter (1990's)

- System is described axiomatically in first-order logic
- Theory has three sorts: action, situation, domain object
- actions: symbols which trigger change
- situations: sequences of actions (world histories)
- domain objects: everything else (cats, cars, numbers, etc.)
- Predicates and functions describe properties of objects: Cat(John)
- Actions are used to construct situations: *feed(John)* executed in the initial situation S₀ yields a new situation *do(feed(John), S₀)*
- Predicates/functions whose last argument is a situation are called fluents: Happy(x, s) — "x is happy in situation s"
- Fluents are what changes from one situation to another. Thus, situations are a frame of reference, but fluents are the state.

Modelling Systems in Situation Calculus

- Basic Action Theories Reiter (2001)
- To describe dynamics of fluent F, begin with effect axioms

$$\phi^+(\bar{x}, a, s) \to F(\bar{x}, do(a, s))$$
 (positive)
 $\phi^-(\bar{x}, a, s) \to \neg F(\bar{x}, do(a, s))$ (negative)

Note: these are general causal rules (*type-level causality*)Example:

$$Cat(x) \land \neg Happy(x, \overbrace{s}^{\text{situation}}) \rightarrow Happy(x, \overbrace{do(feed(x), s)}^{\text{successor situation}})$$

 $Cat(x) \rightarrow \neg Happy(x, do(bathe(x), s))$

• . . •

- Want the theory to unambiguously describe what happens when an action is executed
- Things that change effect axioms
- Things that simply carry over ? (too many to list)

- Causal completeness assumption: there is no other source of change to fluent F other than what is asserted in the effect axioms
- Formally:

$$F(\bar{x},s) \land \neg F(\bar{x},do(a,s)) \to \phi^{-}(\bar{x},a,s)$$
$$\neg F(\bar{x},s) \land F(\bar{x},do(a,s)) \to \phi^{+}(\bar{x},a,s).$$

• Assuming that ϕ^+ and ϕ^- can never happen simultaneously, Reiter derives the successor state axiom

$$F(\bar{x}, do(a, s)) \leftrightarrow \phi^+(\bar{x}, a, s) \lor F(\bar{x}, s) \land \neg \phi^-(\bar{x}, a, s)$$

which is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the above axioms.

• Example:

$$egin{aligned} \mathsf{Happy}(x, \mathsf{do}(\mathsf{a}, \mathsf{s})) &\leftrightarrow \mathsf{a} = \mathsf{feed}(x) \wedge \mathsf{Cat}(x) \wedge \neg \mathsf{Happy}(x, \mathsf{s}) \ &\lor \mathsf{Happy}(x, \mathsf{s}) \wedge \neg [\mathsf{a} = \mathsf{bathe}(x) \wedge \mathsf{Cat}(x)] \end{aligned}$$

- This concise form is the key feature of BATs
- Makes regression possible: given a query about a far-away situation, can transform it to equivalent query about S_0

We use single-step regression operator ρ:
 ρ[φ, α] is obtained from φ by replacing each fluent atom by the RHS of its SSA while substituting α for action variable and simplifying, e.g.

$$High(x, do(a, s)) \leftrightarrow a = hi(x) \lor High(x, s) \land a \neq lo(x)$$

 $\rho[High(x, s), hi(c)] \text{ is } c \neq x \rightarrow High(x, s)$

•
$$\mathcal{D} \models \forall s. \varphi(do(\alpha, s)) \leftrightarrow \rho[\varphi(s), \alpha]$$

Need a standard way of representing a causal scenario, e.g.

An arsonists drops a match in the forest and a lightning bolt strikes a tree. Either one of these events is sufficient to set the forest on fire. What caused the forest fire?

- Causes are actions, effects are FOL sentences (cf. HP)
- BAT captures dynamics, ground situation captures narrative

Definition

A (SC) causal setting is a triple $\langle \mathcal{D}, \sigma, \varphi(s) \rangle$ where \mathcal{D} is a BAT, σ is a ground situation term such that $\mathcal{D} \models executable(\sigma)$, and $\varphi(s)$ is a SC formula uniform in s such that $\mathcal{D} \models \exists s(executable(s) \land \varphi(s))$.

Example (running)



 $Poss(c_{-}on, s),$ $Poss(tick, s) \leftrightarrow ClockOn(s),$ $Poss(hi(x), s) \leftrightarrow \neg High(x, s),$ $Poss(lo(x), s) \leftrightarrow High(x, s),$

 $\begin{aligned} & \textit{ClockOn}(do(a,s)) \leftrightarrow a = c_{-}on \lor \textit{ClockOn}(s), \\ & \textit{High}(x, do(a,s)) \leftrightarrow a = hi(x) \lor \textit{High}(x,s) \land a \neq lo(x), \\ & \textit{En}(do(a,s)) \leftrightarrow a = hi(e_1) \lor a = hi(e_2) \lor \\ & \textit{En}(s) \land \neg [a = lo(e_1) \land \neg \textit{High}(e_2,s)] \land \\ & \neg [a = lo(e_2) \land \neg \textit{High}(e_1,s)], \\ & \textit{Q}(do(a,s)) \leftrightarrow [a = tick \land \textit{En}(s) \land \textit{High}(d,s)] \lor \\ & \textit{Q}(s) \land \neg [a = tick \land \textit{En}(s) \land \neg \textit{High}(d,s)]. \end{aligned}$

Example

Causal setting: $\langle \mathcal{D}, \sigma, Q(s) \rangle$ where \mathcal{D} is the BAT above and σ is $do([c_on, hi(d), tick, hi(e_1), hi(e_2), tick, lo(e_1), lo(e_2), tick, lo(d), tick], S_0)$.



Definition

Let $C = \langle \sigma, \phi \rangle$ be a setting. The action α executed in situation σ_{α} is an *achievement cause of* C iff $do(\alpha, \sigma_{\alpha}) \sqsubseteq \sigma$ and $\mathcal{D} \models \neg \phi(\sigma_{\alpha}) \land \forall s (do(\alpha, \sigma_{\alpha}) \sqsubseteq s \sqsubseteq \sigma \rightarrow \phi(s))$. We write AC(C) to denote the situation term $do(\alpha, \sigma_{\alpha})$ such that α executed in σ_{α} is an achievement cause of C.



go back for an example

- Captured "straw that broke camel's back", what about the rest?
- Recall: $\varphi(do(\alpha, \sigma')) \equiv \rho[\varphi(s), \alpha](\sigma')$ wrt \mathcal{D}
- Thus, if achievement condition is satisfied via $do(\alpha, \sigma')$, then $\rho[\varphi(s), \alpha]$ expresses a true, necessary, and sufficient condition in σ' for achieving $\varphi(s)$ via α
- Can apply last definition to $\langle \rho[\varphi(s),\alpha],\sigma'\rangle$ and repeat
- Must not overlook action preconditions!

Definition (Precursor)

Let $C = \langle \sigma, \phi \rangle$ be a non-trivial setting and let $\sigma^* = AC(C)$ such that $\sigma^* = do(\alpha, \sigma_{\alpha})$. The *achievement precursor* of σ^* , denoted $Pre^A(\sigma^*)$, is the setting $\langle \sigma_{\alpha}, \rho[\phi, \alpha] \land \Pi_{\alpha} \rangle$.

Definition (Causal Chain)

Let $C = \langle \sigma, \phi \rangle$ be a setting. An achievement causal chain of C is a sequence $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \ldots$ such that $\sigma_1 = AC(C)$ and, for every σ_i with i > 1, $\sigma_i = AC(Pre^A(\sigma_{i-1}))$.

The ACC is a mathematical object which represents the achievement causes discovered starting from the given setting and going back through the precursors. Thus, causes appear in ACC in reverse chronological order.

(draw a picture)



- Achievement causal chain does not explain how an effect persists; searches backwards from primary AC
- An already-achieved effect cannot be achieved, but it can be destroyed
- Since it is not destroyed*, either it was not threatened, or the threats were neutralized by what we call *maintenance causes*
- Maintenance involves two actions: a *threat* and a *maintenance cause*
- Maintenance cause precedes the threat
- A false fact cannot be maintained or threatened (thus, the first action of a narrative is not a threat) (and neither is the primary achievement cause)
- A threat is capable of falsifying the effect (counterfactual test)

Definition (Threat)

Let $\mathcal{C} = \langle \sigma, \phi \rangle$. The action τ executed in σ_{τ} is a *threat to* \mathcal{C} iff

- $do(\tau, \sigma_{\tau}) \sqsubseteq \sigma$,
- $\ 2 \ \ \mathcal{D} \models \exists s \big(executable(do(\tau, s)) \land \phi(s) \land \neg \phi(do(\tau, s)) \big), \text{ but}$

The maintenance precursor of $do(\tau, \sigma_{\tau}) \in Threats(\langle \sigma, \phi \rangle)$, denoted $Pre^{M}(do(\tau, \sigma_{\tau}))$, is the setting $\langle \sigma_{\tau}, \rho[\phi, \tau] \rangle$.

Maintenance Cause (cont.)



Definition

Let $\sigma^* \in Threats(\mathcal{C})$. The action α executed in σ_{α} is a maintenance cause of \mathcal{C} iff α executed in σ_{α} is the achievement cause of $Pre^{\mathcal{M}}(\sigma^*)$.

Example (altered scenario)

Consider the same BAT with an infinite set of signal constants c_1, c_2, \ldots

- Query $\varphi(s)$: $\exists x \exists y (x \neq y \land High(x, s) \land High(y, s))$
- Narrative σ : $do([hi(c_1), hi(c_2), hi(c_3), lo(c_1)], S_0)$.

 $lo(c_1)$ is a threat. Yields a new causal setting $\langle do([hi(c_1), hi(c_2), hi(c_3)], S_0), \rho[\varphi(s), lo(c_1)] \rangle$, where $\rho[\varphi(s), lo(c_1)]$ is

 $\exists x \exists y (x \neq y \land High(x, s) \land High(y, s) \land x \neq c_1 \land y \neq c_1).$

 $hi(c_3)$ is an achievement cause here, so it is a maintenance cause in the original setting.

note the open domain and quantifiers

- Preceding definitions do not capture interplay between achievement and maintenance
- Assumption: all causes of a descendant causal setting are equally relevant to ancestor setting

Definition (Actual Cause)

The set of *parental settings of* C, denoted PS(C), is the smallest set which contains C and, for each $C' \in PS(C)$,

- $Pre^{A}(AC(C')) \in PS(C);$
- $Pre^{M}(\sigma^{\star}) \in PS(\mathcal{C})$ for each $\sigma^{\star} \in Threats(\mathcal{C}')$.

The action α executed in σ_{α} is an *actual cause of* C iff $do(\alpha, \sigma_{\alpha}) \in \{AC(C') \mid C' \in PS(C)\}.$

Inductive Tree of Actual Causality



Example (running example again)

The action $lo(e_2)$ is a non-trivial actual cause of Q(s) discovered through a combination of two maintenance conditions (first threat *tick*, second threat lo(d)). It is not discoverable without the last definition.



Halpern-Pearl approach (very briefly)

- Causal models [Pearl, 1998]
- Multi-valued variables, e.g. the binary FF (forest is on fire, true/false)
- Structural equations, e.g. $FF := (MD = true) \land (L = true)$
- CM are acyclic (exists unique solution to equations)
- A language with semantics based on the unique solution
- *Interventions*: force values upon some of the variables, see what happens to "effect", e.g.

$$M, \bar{u} \models [MD \leftarrow false](FF = true)$$

• Latest version of defn. of AC (HP^m) is an incremental improvement [Halpern, 2015]

Formal relationship of HP and our approach

- Axiomatization schema turns an arbitrary HP to a SC causal setting
- Proved correctness of translation, cause correspondence

Theorem (Main result)

Let (M, \overline{V}_U) be a HP causal setting and ϕ a HP query over M. Let \mathcal{D} be a BAT obtained from (M, \overline{V}_U) . Let $X \in \mathcal{V}$ and $V_X \in \mathcal{R}(X)$.

- $(X = V_X)$ is a singleton cause of ϕ in (M, \bar{V}_U) according to HP^m if and only if $get(X, V_X) \in \sigma$ appears in the achievement causal chain of $\langle \sigma, \hat{\phi}(s) \rangle$ for every ground situation term σ of \mathcal{D} such that $\mathcal{D} \models interv_{\emptyset}(\sigma)$.
- (X = V_X) is a part of a cause of φ in (M, V
 U) according to HP^m if and only if there exists a ground situation term σ of D such that D ⊨ interv∅(σ) and get(X, V_X) ∈ σ appears in the achievement causal chain of $\langle \sigma, \hat{\phi}(s) \rangle$.

According to [Beckers and Vennekens, 2012], the following examples are isomorphic

Assassin poisons victim's coffee, victim drinks it and dies. If assassin had not poisoned the coffee, his backup would have, and victim would still have died. ([Hitchcock, 2007]) [Beckers and Vennekens, 2012]: intuitively, poisoning is a cause

An engineer is standing by a switch in the railroad track. A train approaches in the distance. She flips the switch, so that the train travels down the left-hand track instead of the right. Since the tracks re-converge up ahead, the train arrives at its destination all the same. [Hall, 2000, Paul and Hall, 2013] [Beckers and Vennekens, 2012]: intuitively, switching is not a cause

- Our proposal is based on a small set of plausible intuitions, yet is compatible with previous work built on completely different premises
- Rich ontology of SC takes "art" out of causal modelling [Halpern, 2016], e.g., transition ≠ condition
- Precondition axioms uncover a separate causal pathway ignored in previous work, allowing for better causal explanations
- Unrestricted FOL allows to analyze complex domains and "effects" with quantifiers

- Hybrid situation calculus causes of continuous phenomena
- Absense of action as a cause
- Partially ordered or incomplete narratives
- Higher-level causes
- Attribution of causes to agents, responsibility and blame
- Causes across abstraction and refinement

Questions?

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- Maintenance Causes
- Actual Cause

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Conclusions



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