

# Execution-time opacity problems in (parametric) timed automata

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1 Join work with Étienne André, Engel Lefauchaux, Didier Lime, Sun Jun

## 2 1 Introduction

3 Complex timed systems combine hard real-time constraints with concurrency.  
4 Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on the security of such  
5 systems. Among harmful information leaks, the *timing information leakage* is  
6 the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information depending on timing  
7 information. In this work, we focus on timing leakage through the total execution  
8 time, *i. e.*, when a system works as an almost black-box and the ability of the  
9 attacker is limited to know the model and observe the total execution time. We  
10 consider the setting of timed automata (TAs), which is a popular extension of  
11 finite-state automata with clocks [AD94].

12 *Context and related works* Franck Cassez proposed in [Cas09] a first definition  
13 of *timed opacity*: the system is opaque if an attacker cannot deduce whether  
14 some set of actions was performed, by only observing a given set of observable  
15 actions together with their timestamp. It is then proved in [Cas09] that it is un-  
16 decidable whether a TA is opaque, even for the restricted class of event-recording  
17 automata [AFH99] (a subclass of TAs). This notably relates to the undecidability  
18 of timed language inclusion for TAs [AD94].

19 The aforementioned negative result leaves hope only if the definition or  
20 the setting is changed, which was done in three main lines of works. The  
21 different studied options were to reduce the expressiveness of the formal-  
22 ism [WZ18,WZA18], to time-bound the system [AETYM21] or to consider a  
23 weaker attacker, who has access only to the *execution time* [ALMS22,ALM23].  
24 We present here a summary of our work in this latter setting [ALMS22,ALM23].

## 25 2 Execution time and opacity

26 In the setting of TAs, we denote by *execution time* the time from the system  
27 start to the reachability of a given (final) location. Therefore, given a secret  
28 location, a TA is ET-opaque for an execution time  $d$  if there exist at least two  
29 paths of duration  $d$  from the initial location to a final location: one visiting  
30 the secret location, and another one *not* visiting the secret location. In other  
31 words, if an attacker measures such an execution time from the initial location

1 to the target location  $\ell_f$ , then this attacker is not able to deduce whether the  
 2 system visited  $\ell_{priv}$ . Deciding whether at least one such  $d$  exists can be seen as  
 3 an *existential* version of ET-opacity.

4 Then, the system is *fully ET-opaque* if it is ET-opaque *for all execution*  
 5 *times*: that is, for each possible  $d$ , either no final location is reachable, or the  
 6 final location is reachable for at least two paths, one visiting the secret location,  
 7 and another one not visiting it. Moreover, it is *weakly ET-opaque* if for each  
 8 run visiting the secret location, there exists a run not visiting it with the same  
 9 duration; the dual may not hold.

10 We also consider in [ALM23] an *expiring version of ET-opacity*, where the  
 11 secret is subject to an expiration date. That is, we consider that an attack is  
 12 successful only when the attacker can decide that the secret location was visited  
 13 less than  $\Delta$  time units before the system completion. Conversely, if the attacker  
 14 exhibits an execution time  $d$  for which it is certain that the secret location was  
 15 visited, but this location was visited strictly more than  $\Delta$  time units prior to the  
 16 system completion, then this attack is useless, and can be seen as a failed attack.  
 17 The system is therefore *fully expiring ET-opaque* if the set of execution times  
 18 for which the private location was visited within  $\Delta$  time units prior to system  
 19 completion (referred as “secret times”) is exactly equal to the set of execution  
 20 times for which the private location was either not visited or visited more than  $\Delta$   
 21 time units prior to system completion (referred as “non-secret times”). Moreover,  
 22 it is *weakly expiring ET-opaque* if only the inclusion of the secret times into the  
 23 non-secret ones is verified.

**Table 1.** Summary of the definitions for ET-opacity and expiring ET-opacity [ALMS22,ALM23]

	Secret runs	Non-secret runs
ET-opacity	Runs visiting the private location (= private runs)	Runs not visiting the private location (= public runs)
expiring-ET-opacity	Runs visiting the private location $\leq \Delta$ time units before the system completion	(i) Runs not visiting the private location and (ii) Runs visiting the private location $> \Delta$ time units before the system completion

The system is (resp. expiring)	if
ET-opaque	$\{\text{secret runs}\} \cap \{\text{non-secret runs}\} \neq \emptyset$
weakly ET-opaque	$\{\text{secret runs}\} \subseteq \{\text{non-secret runs}\}$
full ET-opacity	$\{\text{secret runs}\} = \{\text{non-secret runs}\}$

24 In **Table 1**, we formalize the different definitions of (expiring) ET-opacity.

25 *Example 1.* Consider the TA in **Fig. 1**. Fix  $\Delta = 1$ .

26 The durations of:




Fig. 1. A TA example

- 1 – the runs not visiting the private location (public runs) is  $[0, 3]$
- 2 – the runs visiting the private location (private runs) is  $[1, 2.5]$
- 3 – the runs visiting the private location  $> \Delta$  time units before the system
- 4 completion is  $[2, 2.5]$
- 5 – the runs visiting the private location  $\leq \Delta$  time units before the system
- 6 completion is  $[1, 2.5]$

7 Therefore, we say that the TA is:

- 8 –  $\exists$ -ET-opaque, as  $[1, 2.5] \cap [0, 3] = [1, 2.5]$
- 9 – weakly ET-opaque, as  $[1, 2.5] \subseteq [0, 3]$
- 10 – not fully ET-opaque, as  $[1, 2.5] \neq [0, 3]$
- 11 –  $\exists$ -expiring-ET-opaque, as  $[1, 2] \cap ([2, 2.5] \cup [0, 3]) = [1, 2]$
- 12 – weakly expiring-ET-opaque, as  $[1, 2.5] \subseteq ([2, 2.5] \cup [0, 3])$
- 13 – not expiring-ET-opaque, as  $[1, 2.5] \neq ([2, 2.5] \cup [0, 3])$

### 14 3 Parametrization and results

15 In addition to TAs, we studied parametric problems, over parametric timed  
 16 automata (PTAs), which extend TAs with parameters within guards and in-  
 17 variants in place of integer constants [AHV93]. We also consider a subclass of  
 18 PTAs where parameters are partitioned between lower-bound and upper-bound  
 19 parameters [HRSV02], called *lower-bound/upper-bound PTAs* (L/U-PTAs).

20 In Tables 2 and 3, we present the decidability results introduced  
 21 in [ALMS22,ALM23]. We denote a problem with a green check if it is decidable,  
 22 a red cross if it is undecidable and by a yellow question mark if it is open (or not  
 23 considered in the aforementioned papers).  $(p + \Delta)$ -synthesis (resp. emptiness)  
 24 problem asks for the synthesis (resp. asks for the non-existence) of a parameter  
 25 valuation and an expiring bound  $\Delta$  for which the ET-opacity is verified.

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**Table 2.** Summary of the results for ET-opacity [ALMS22]

		$\exists$ -ET-opacity	weakly opaque	ET-opacity	fully opaque	ET-opacity
Decision	TA	✓	?	✓	✓	✓
$p$ -emptiness	PTA	×	?	×	×	×
	L/U-PTA	✓	?	×	×	×
$p$ -synthesis	PTA	×	?	×	×	×
	L/U-PTA	×	?	×	×	×

**Table 3.** Summary of the results for expiring-ET-opacity [ALM23]

		$\exists$ -expiring-ET-opacity	weakly expiring-ET-opacity	fully expiring-ET-opacity
$\Delta$ -emptiness	TA	?	✓	✓
$\Delta$ -synthesis		?	✓	?
$(p + \Delta)$ -emptiness	PTA	?	×	×
	L/U-PTA	?	×	×
$(p + \Delta)$ -synthesis	PTA	?	×	×
	L/U-PTA	?	×	×

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